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Abstract 1988; Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter 1988) cannot 
work as there extsts no probability measure that 
In this paper the elicitation of probabilities from simultaneously meets all constraints. The ratio-
human experts is considered as a measurement 
process, which may be disturbed by random 
·measurement noise'. Using Bayesian concepts a 
second order probability distribution is derived 
reflecting the uncertainty of the input probabil­
Ities. The algorithm is based on an approxi­
mate sample representation of the basic proba­
bilities. This sample is continuously modified by 
a stochastic simulation procedure. the Metropo­
lis algorithm, such that the sequence of succes­
sive samples corresponds to the desired posterior 
distribution. The procedure is able to combine 
inconsistent probabilities according to their re­
liability and is applicable to general inference 
networks with arbitrary structure. Dempster­
Shafer probability mass functions may be in­
cluded using specific measurement distributions. 
The properties of the approach are demonstrated 
by numerical experiments. 
1 Introduction 
Most probabilistic inference systems pretend 
that the available probabilities are exact point 
values . Psychological studies [Hogarth 1987), 
however, show that human experts have only 
moderate abilities as probability assessors and 
often are unable to specify point estimates. If 
an expert estimates several interrelated proba­
bilities these often are incoherent arid violate the 
laws of probability calculus 1ln this situation up­
date mechanisms for poiny probabilities [Pearl 
•This work was supported b� the German Federal De­
partment of Research and Tecynology. grant ITW8900A 7 
1 
nality of experts, which is the basis of subjective 
probability theories [Cheeseman 1988], seems to 
be only a theoretical ideal and does not apply to 
practical situations. 
We consider the elicitation of probabilities by 
experts to be some sort of measurement pro­
cess which may be disturbed by 'measurement 
noise'. This noise again is assumed to be ran­
dom and therefore induces a second order prob­
ability measure, which describes the distribu­
tion of the probabilities delivered by the experts. 
The application of Bayesian principles allows to 
take into account various forms of information on 
marginal probabilities, conditional probabilities, 
probability intervals, and arbitrary other param­
eters of the probability measure always· consider­
ing their relative precision. In contrast to prob­
ability intervals, which always reflect worst case 
errors, the utilization of measurement distribu­
tions allows to express the relative plausibility 
of different feasible values. Consequently the de­
rived imprecision of result probabilities in gen­
eral will be smaller. 
In the paper the basic 'first order' probability 
distribution p is represented approximately by 
a random sample of 'possible worlds'. Then 
the desired second order posterior distribution 
P(p) evolves during the continuous modification 
of this sample with the Metropolis algorithm, 
which is the essential component of the simu­
lated annealing algorithm [Mitra & al. 1986]. 
The underlying inference networks may have a 
general structure with cycles. This contrasts to 
causal probabilistic networks, where the nodes 
have a causal ordering [Pearl 1988, Andersen & 
a!. 1989]. 
Imprecise probabilities are usually represented 
by probability intervals [Nilsson 1986. Grosof 
1986], e.g. p(A) E [a. b]. An uncertain version is 
the statement: "In 907< of the cases p(A) E [a, b] 
holds'' . The algorithm described below can pro­
cess such uncertain probability intervals. The 
utilization of second order probability distribu­
tions was first proposed by [Lindley & a!. 1979] 
to pool the opinions of the members of a com­
mittee. A discussion is given by [Genest & Zidek 
1986, Paass 1988, Kyburg 1989]. Stochastic 
simulation approaches for probabilistic reasoning 
have been used by [Pearl 1988. Henrion 1988] to 
determine ·first order · probability d istributions 
for precise and consistent input probabilities. 
2 Probabilistic Model 
Suppose the situation in question can be spec­
ified in terms of k d ifferent basic propositions 
ul' . . ' 'Uk. A term WT := l\ 1\ ... 1\ (!k with 
(Ji E { Ui, 'Vi} embodies a comprehensive de­
scription of the situation and is called a pos­
sible world. Define :F as the set of proposi­
tions which can be formed by disjunctions of the 
m := 2k different possible worlds. Suppose the 
uncertainty about the true possible world is de­
scribed by a probability measure p : :F - [0, 1] 
which assigns a probability value PT := P(W,) 
to each W,. This measure is completely defined 
by the parameter vector p := (Pl, ... , Pm). Let 
Q := {(p1, · · · ,pm) I Pi� 0, L�1 Pi= 1} be the 
set of all probability measures over :F. 
Information on the probability measure (or its 
characteristics) may be available from differ­
ent sources: physical measurement devices, fre­
quency counts from samples, or expert judge­
ments. Assume there are d pieces of evidence 
1r := ( ;h, . . . , ird) on p. Each ii"; may be related to 
any measurable function rri(P) of the parameters 
p. For example ii"; may be equal to a probability 
p(.4), a conditional probability p(A I B), an odds 
ratio p(A I B)fp(A I •B), or an indicator which 
states, for instance, whether p(.4 1\ B) < 0.1 
or p( A) > p( B) is true. The different ii"i may 
be uncertain and incoherent to some extent and 
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are considered as some sort of measurement with 
an associated measurement noise. For physical 
measurements the noise t·esults from perturba­
tions of the measurement process, while for sta­
tistical samples it is caused by sampling fluctua­
tions. For expert judgements measurement noise 
can be used to model the large fluctuations and 
incoherence of probability values specified by ex­
perts [Hogart 198i]. 
An independent investigator has the task to inte­
grate these measurements. For him the measure­
ment values 7r and the probabilities p are part of 
the external world about which he is uncertain 
and whose random relation is cap tured by a joint 
probability distribution P( ?r,p). The capital P 
indicates that the distribution is a ·second or­
der' probability distribution describing random 
variables which themselves are probabilities. We 
suppose that the investigator can specify a sub­
jective measurement distribution P(i I p) re­
flecting his subjectively assessed distribution of 
possible measurements 7r for each probability 
vector p E Q. Here we assume that the inves­
tigator acts as a rational agent who is able to 
formulate his subjective opinion in the form of 
coherent probability distributions. Note that the 
investigator does not specify any preference for 
some specific p as  he defines P(?r I p) for every 
possible value of p. 
The measurement distribution is selected accord­
ing to the type of measurement, e.g. the nor­
mal distribution for continuous statistics or the 
binomial distribution for probabilities [Ginsberg 
1985, Paass 1986]. The latter seems appropri­
ate if the expert bases his judgement on the ex­
perience gained from a number of cases. Under 
specific circumstances the measurement distribu­
tion may be very simple . Assume an expert has 
to answer the question "Is p(A) � 0.8 ?". Then 
ii"; can take the two values 0 or 1 meaning 'yes' 
or 'no'. The noise distribution just consists of 
two probability values: the probability that the 
expert would say ·yes' if really p(A) � 0.8 and 
the probability that the expert would say 'yes' if 
p(A) < 0.8. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3 The Bayesian Posterior Dis­
tribution 
The measurement distribution P( i' I p) is the in­
vestigator's subjective assessment of the relation 
between p and the measurement data n-. The 
marginal distribution P(p) can be interpreted 
as the investigator's prior distribution which de­
scribes his subjective state of knowledge on p 
before he knows any measurements. Hence the 
joint distribution P(n-,p) = P(n- I p)P(p) en­
tirely rests on his subjective judgements. Then 
Bayes theorem yields his subjective posterior 
density of p after the information ;r has been 
taken into account 
P( In-)= 
P(n- I p)P(p) 
p 
P(;r) ( 1) 
485 
however. the investigator is interested in the dis­
tribution P(f(p) I i') of more global character­
istics f(p), for instance J(p) := p(A) for some 
A. E F. To determine the posterior probability 
that f(p) is in a specific interval, say [a, b] he has 
to determine 
P( Af[a,b) I i) = f P(p li)dp }M[a,b] ( 4) 
where M[a.b) := {p E Q I f(p) E [a,b]}. Ex­
cept for trivial cases the analytical solution is 
intractable and we have to use a numerical ap­
proach. Conceptually we generate a sequence of 
qi E Q distributed a.ccording to P( q I i) and 
approximate the integral by � L:i=l F(q;) where 
F(p) is the indicator function of M[a,b]· If the 
q; are the realizations of an ergodic stationary 
Markov chain with distribution P(q I i') the sum 
converges to the integral by the ergodic theorem. 
The likelihood P(p I n-) assigns a value t.o each 
p which characterizes the degree of belief of the 
investigator that p is the true probability dis­
tribution. For given ;r the denominator P(i') 
is a constant. Note that the measurements iri 4 
of the different sources may be correlated with 
Stochastic 
Sa1nples 
Generation of 
each other. This happens. for example. if two 
measurements are based on some common in­
formation. However. the formula is simplified 
considerably if we assume that each iri has been 
determined independently from the others. Then 
the joint likelihood is a product 
d 
P(i I p) :=II P(iri I p) 
i=l 
(2) 
In the important case that we have a random 
sample of size ni and we only observe whether 
a proposition B E ;: holds or not, we get the 
binomial likelihood 
P( ;ri I p) 
ex: 11'i(P)n'�. + ( 1 - iT;(p))n'(l-�,) 
(3) 
If for some measurement i there is no p such that 
P( 1f I p) is greater than zero the measurement is 
inconsistent and no posterior distribution exists. 
The investigator may avoid this problem, for in­
stance by assigning a possibly low but nonzero 
likelihood P(i I p) > 0 to each pair p, i. 
The posterior distribution P(p I i) is a common 
joint density of the possible worlds. In general, 
The vector p has m = 2k elements; a number 
which already for a moderate number k of basic 
propositions is prohibitively large. Therefore we 
approximate p by a random sample of n possible 
worlds W,.. Let Qn C Q be the set of probabil­
ity vectors with values in {Q, l, . . .  , !!:}. Then 
• n n n 
at most n different probabilities are larger than 
zero. According to the Law of Large Numbers 
any distribution p E P can be approximated ar­
bitrary well by a sample q E Qn if the sample 
size n is chosen sufficiently large. 
To generate the ergodic sequence q E Qn we uti­
lize the Metropolis algorithm [Kalos & Whitlock 
1986, p.73ff]. Let X,. := ( w.,.(l)' . . .  'WT(nj) be 
a sample containing n of the m possible worlds. 
The algorithm starts with an arbitrary sample. 
In an iterative fashion the 'current' sample X.,. is 
modified to a new sample X11 and subsequently 
it is checked whether the modification can be ac­
cepted. A modification usually consist of rather 
small changes, for instance transforming Ui to 
· ..,ui in one or more possible worlds W.,.(j). The 
probability Pmod(X.,.,X11) of modifying X.,. to XTJ 
may be derived from some real, nonnegative, and 
symmetric function g( .\ r, XI/) 
= 
g(Xr.XT)) 
g(Xr) 
Lg(Xr, X17) 
1/ 
(5) 
( 6) 
A trivial 
choice is Pmod(X.,.,Xrd = Pmod(XTJ,X.,.) 2: 0. If 
q(Xr) E Qn is the empirical distribution corre­
sponding to Xr the modification is accepted with 
probability 
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P( i I q(X) V' corresponds to the situation that 
for each individual term we observe the same 
statistic ir; from ;3 * n; instead of n; independent 
observations. 
Starting with an arbitrary sample X the updat­
ing scheme ( 6) and (I) eventually will converge 
to the stationary distribution ( 8 ). However the 
convergence to this distribution may take a long 
time if the constraints imposed by the data i are 
difficult to accomplish. To speed up the conver­
gence we may start the procedure with a value 
;3 < < 1 and gradually increase J to 1. Simulated 
annealing theory shows that in this way the de­
sired stationary distribution is approached much 
faster t.han in the case that we fix J to 1. If each X.,. can be transformed into any other .'<11 
by a finite number of modifications. the proba­
bility Pr(X I i) of .Y being generated converges 
to an unique stationary distribution 5 Prior Distributions 
Pr(X I i) = c1g(X)P(i I q(X)) (8) 
as the number of iterations goes to infinity [Mitra 
& al. 1986]. Here c1 is a constant normalizing 
the sum of probabilities to one. Hence the corre­
sponding stationary distribution of the p E Q71 
is proportional to the posterior distribution 
Pr(p I i) L P(X J i) 
X:r;(X)=p 
P( i I p)g(p) (9) 
with g(p) := LX;q(X)=p c1g(X). In the simple 
case of symmetric modification probabilities, i.e. 
Pmod(X11, X.,.) = Pmod(Xr, .\'17) for all X17, X.,., 
the term g(p) is a constant. 
If we use P(i I q(X))P instead of P(i l q(X)) 
in (7) and let /3 grow to infinity, then accord­
ing to simulated annealing theory [Mitra & al. 
1986] the corresponding stationary distribution 
Pr13(X I i) concentrates on the set of maximum 
values of the aposteriori distribution P( X I i'). 
For non-informative priors the resulting solution 
is equal to the maximum likelihood solution. But 
how can we interpret the term P(i I q(X))/3? 
In the joint likelihood P(i I p) = ni P(ir; I p) 
each individual term P(iri I p) represents ni � 1 
observations of the statistic iri. lf we had two in­
dependent samples with the same observations 
we would get the term P( ii-i I p) * P( iri I p) 
in the joint likelihood. Hence a joint likelihood 
To utilize the Bayesian approach the investiga­
tor has to select a prior probability distribution 
P(p). If he has no preference for some ranges of 
probability he can specify a noninformative prior 
which favours no p over others. Because of its 
invariance to transformations, textbooks [Berger 
1980 p. i 4ff) recommend versions of the Dirichlet. 
density which is proportional to n T p( Wr )"' -l. 
usually with cr < 1. There is. however. still a de­
bate on which prior probability to choose [Har­
tigan 1983 p.96]. 
ln general the available evidence concerns only 
a few lower order characteristics of p. The 
distribution of all higher order interactions is 
completely determined by the prior distribution. 
Hence in some respect the choice of a noninfor­
mative prior makes explicit the structural hy­
potheses which in other updating formalisms are 
hidden in the maximum entropy assumption [cf. 
Cheeseman 1985]. As. however, prior distribu­
tions usually give nonzero density to every pa­
rameter value, they are far less restrictive than 
the maximum entropy assumption. In our al­
gorithm a prior density can be integrated in two 
different ways: we first may simply use the prod­
uct P(i I q(X))P(q(X)) of the prior density and 
the likelihood to determine the probability of ac-
. ceptance in (7). Obviously we may incorporate 
arbitrary priors in this way. Alternatively we 
may define an appropriate g(X.,., X17) such that 
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the prior distribution evolves as the stationary 
distribution of the modification process (6). 
In our numerical experiments we used a uniform 
prior for each p( Ui), which is a special case of the 
Dirichlet distribution. It. was generated by defin­
ing an appropriate g( X r· X17). Assume p( U;) has 
a specific value, e.g. p( Cd = 0. 7. Then with 
equal probability p( Ui) is increased or reduced 
for a small amount 6. In the case of increase. for 
instance, we randomly select one or more pos­
sible worlds where -.U, ho lds from the current 
sample Xr and change them to U;. Hence P( U;) 
follows a random walk with the reflecting barri­
ers 0 and 1. As the mean distance to the starting 
value of p(U;) after k modifications is propor­
tional to 6k1 12 , we have to select 6 large enough, 
to arrive at the unifonn distribution of p( U;) in 
a short enough time. 
The modifications of the different p( U;) were per­
formed mutually independent. From the inde­
pendence follows that for (; E { Ui , -.U;} the 
conditional probability p( C; I CJ1 1\ · · · 1\ [\) for 
arbitrary Jr =f:. i has a uniform prior distribu­
tion too. If the resulting posterior distribution 
P(p( U, I Uj) I i) of some conditional probability 
p( U; I Uj) is different from the uniform distribu­
tion, this effect is caused by the observed data. 
This seems to be a desirable property for the 
evaluation of inference networks. The g( X r, X.,.,)­
terms resulting from this scheme of generating 
the prior distribution cort'espond to the condi­
tions ( 6) and hence the stationary distribution 
( 8) results. 
If we want to determine the probability of some 
B for a situation where U; is known to hold. 
we have to estimate the conditional probability 
p( B I Ui). Whenever the probability of U; is low 
then a sample Xr usually will comprise only few 
or none possible worlds W.,., where U; holds and 
the estimated posterior distribution for p( B I U;) 
will exhibit a high variance. This situation may 
be avoided by using weighted samples to allow 
that possible worlds with low weights may be 
generated where U; holds. To each possible world 
Wr(j) in the sample Xr := (Wr(I)1···,Wr(nj) a 
weight Wj 2: 0 is attached with Li w; = 1. For 
half of the possible worlds the i-th basic propo­
sition is fixed to U; while for the rest it is set to 
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-.[!;. The prior distribution for U; is generated 
by changing the weights such that p( Ui) follows 
a random walk with reflecting barriers 0 and 1. 
All definitions given above may be easily ex­
tended to the case that the basic aspects of the 
situation are characterized by more than two 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions 
Ui1, . . . . Uik,. Again we can use independent 
Dirichlet priors for the marginal distribution of 
the different aspects. If an aspect corresponds 
to a numerical variab le u, we can either model it 
by a large number of mutually exclusive propo­
sitions U;1, . . . , U;k, with each Uil correspond­
ing to some value �il of u; . Alternatively one 
can include a continuous u; directly without any 
discretization using the �hrkov chain results of 
[Kalos & Whitlock 1986]. Then we could take 
into account measurements �vhich. for instance. 
state that the mean value of Ui is equal to 13.6 
or that u; 2: 10.5 with probability 0.8. 
6 De1npster-Shafer Theory 
As shown by [Kyburg 1987. Paass 1988] ev­
ery Dempster-Shafer belief function may be ex­
pressed by inequality constraints on an under­
lying probability measure p. In the frame­
work of this paper we may consider a proba­
bility mass function as the result of a measure­
ment process. This shall be demonstrated by a 
small example. Assume there are m = 3 possi­
ble worlds wl' w2' w3 and let :F be the corre­
sponding Boolean algebra with 8 elements F := 
{0, Wt, ... , W3, Wt VW2 .... , W1 VW2VW3}. As­
sume information on p is contained in the follow­
ing probability mass function p ; F- [0, 1]: 
J.J( WI)= 0.3; p( W3) = O.l: 
J.t(W2 V W3) = 0.4; J.t(Wt V W2 V W3) = 0.2; 
Let us define an observable variable rr taking the 
non-negative values iT1 = p( vV1 ) , iT3 = p( W3), 
rr23 = p(W2 V W3), ii-123 = p( Wt V ltV2 V W3) 
summing up to 1. Then we may define a map­
ping 1r = H(n)p by 
( :: ) = ( O�J � O�J ) 
ii-23 0 CV21 0<32 
ii-123 1-C>JJ 1-0'21 }-Cl'3J-CV32 
with unknown parameters Oij· Now we may de-
p(BjA)=O.B* 
• 
p(AIB)=O. 7t 
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0 p(A)=0.2' 
1 p(C[B)=0.8' p(AID)=O.Str r p(AI�D)=0.5' 
p(DIC)=0.8* 
p(DI-.C)=0.5* 
*: ±0.2 
t: ±0.1 
Figure 1: Inference Network for Numerical Demonstration 
fine P(ii' I p) = canst > 0 if i = H(cr)p such 
that all CXij E [0, 1] and P(ir I p) = 0 otherwise. 
After proper normalization P( ir I p) may be con­
sidered as a measurement distribution. Using 
the Bayesian Formula ( 1) we may derive a pos­
terior distribution P(p I i). If in addition we 
use a non-informative prior P(p) = canst, the 
posterior P(p I i) is constant on its support 
Mir := {p � Q I 30i = H(cx)p}. From this 
set upper and lower probabilities for arbitrary 
B E :F may be determined . 
The measurement distribution may be enhanced 
in the usual way to cover situations where the 
assignment of a sample element to some ;ri may 
be subject to error. More important we may 
have different samples corresponding to different 
probability mass functions. Then the Bayesian 
Formula (1) is a way to to combine these different 
pieces of evidence with the sample size indicating 
their reliability. 
7 Numerical Demonstration 
We applied the algorithm to a small inference 
network with uncertain rules which form a cycle. 
Inference nets with this general structure cannot 
be handled directly by other inference techniques 
requiring an ordering of the nodes. In the model 
two ·symptoms' A and B affect the probability of 
the ·outcomes' C and D. We assumed that the 
probabilities given in figure ( 1) had been esti­
mated by independent experts. The investigator 
assigned a binomial measurement distribution to 
the experts estimating that the values supplied 
were exact to ±0.1 or ±0.2 in 90% of the cases. 
These intervals were used to derive the parame­
ters of the corresponding binomial measurement 
distributions giving likelihoods (4). 
For the simu lation of the posterior distribution 
P(p I i} a sample X of size n = 200 was utilized. 
In a first analysis the information p( A I B) = 0.7 
was omitted. Using the Metropolis algorithm 
with {3 = 1 the distribution of the sample quickly 
reached a stationary state. The characteristics of 
the posterior distribution of each possible world 
were determined according to ( 4) and are shown 
on the left side of table (1). The probability es­
timates show a considerable variance around the 
the median, the 50%-percentile of the posterior 
distribution. The difference between the 25%­
percentile and the i5%-percentile in many rows 
is larger than the median. 
The probabilities derived so far describe the gen­
eral stochastic relation between the propositions . 
Now assume that evidence arrives that for a spe­
cific case one or more of the 'symptoms' B and 
A hold. The resulting probability is given by the 
posterior distribution of the corresponding con­
ditional probability, e.g. p( D I B). Three such 
distributions were determined using ( 4) and are 
given in the last lines of table ( 1). Again the 
distributions have a rather large spread. The 
observation of the new fact ....,B not always leads 
to a reduction of variance as shown by the com­
parison of p(D I ....,B) and p(D I -,A 1\ ....,B). 
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Table 1: Percentiles of the Posterior Distributions for Selected Probabilities 
Percentiles 
p(A I B)= 0.7 omitted p(A I B)= 0 .7 included 
10% 2.5% 50% 75% 
p(-.A...,B-.C-.D) .01:! .lL?.s .042 .062 
p(-.A...,B-.CD) .002 .007 .014 .030 
p(-.rbBC-.D) .000 .000 .003 .lllO 
p(-.A...,BCD) .000 .000 .008 .008 
p( -.AB-.C-.D) .00:.? .009 .019 .030 
p(-.AB-.CD) .008 .017 .025 .0:37 
p(-.ABC-.D) .008 .017 .033 .058 
p(-.ABCD) .050 .067 .092 .1:.?3 
p(A-.B-.C-.D) .030 .043 .055 .07:3 
p(A-.B-.CD) .009 .0:.?4 .040 .066 
p(A-.BC-.D) .000 .000 .008 .017 
p(A-.BCD) .008 .017 .033 .042 
p(AB...,C-.D) .010 .017 .027 051 
p(AB-.CD) .(!.50 .067 .091 117 
p(ABC...,D) .on .050 .075 .11 i 
p(ABCD) .258 .31 i .375 .433 
p(D I B) .. 589 .694 .781 .841 
p(D 1-.B) .259 .360 .486 .. 57 4 
p(D I -.A 1\ -.B) .098 .:.?:.? 1 .347 .441 
Assume an additional expert states p( A. I B) = 
0. 70 and the investigator judges this measure­
ment to be rather reliable with a 90%-interval 
of ±U.l. The right part of table 1 contains the 
resulting posterior distributions. \Vhile the dis­
tribution of p(D I B) is only slightly affected by 
the modification, the medians of p( D I -.8) and 
p(D I -,A 1\ -,B) are sharply reduced. If in addi­
tion p(B I -,A) = 0.3 is introduced with a 90%­
interval of ±0.1 this information is contradic-
90% 10% 25% 50% 75 % 90% 
.on .060 .090 .128 .1.50 .1.57 
.043 .002 .003 .010 .021 .032 
.017 .000 .00:.? .003 .011 .0:.?5 
.017 .000 .000 .008 .008 .017 
.038 .00:.? .005 .010 .0:30 .053 
.053 .008 .01 i .025 .04:.? .050 
.091 .000 .008 .025 .038 .050 
.166 .050 .067 .075 .099 .1:.?4 
.085 .000 .00:3 .010 .0:.?6 .0.53 
.108 .00:.? .008 .017 .033 .066 
.026 .000 .00:.? .008 .017 .0:.?8 
.068 .017 .017 .033 .050 .066 
.071 .008 .017 .027 .047 .058 
.153 .051 .Oi.S .100 .125 .149 
.143 .059 .07.5 .108 .156 .192 
.491 .225 .294 .358 .408 .467 
.906 .550 .675 .765 .813 .845 
.6:.?9 .183 .245 .330 .390 .498 
.593 .019 .064 .120 . .?09 .339 
tribution was chosen to be multinomial. After 
2 minutes processing time on an IB!\rl :3093 the 
algorithm had reached stationary state. This ex­
periment shows that the procedure may be ap­
plied to larger inference networks with arbitrary 
structure. The result. is plausible as the under­
lying simulated annealing algm·ithm is a global 
optimization procedure with good convergence 
properties. 
tory to some extend. By comparing the resulting 
mean posterior probabilities with the initial mea- 8 
surement distributions we can assess the extend 
Sum1nary and Discussion 
of contradiction for each piece of information. 
The observation p(A I B) = O.i turns out to be 
·most contradictory· in this sense. This demon­
strates how incompatible pieces of evidence can 
be spotted during the evaluation of the inference 
network. 
In a last test we applied the algorithm to 
a larger randomly generated inference network 
with 40 basic propositions. There were more 
than 400 uncertain restrictions on probabili­
ties relating up to four randomly selected basic 
propositions . The inference net.work contained 
many loops and cycles. The measurement dis-
We have presented an algorithm that is able to 
int.egrat.e uncertain probability estimates and to 
approximate the corresponding Bayesian second 
order posterior distribution by the simulation of 
a random sample. The approach is applicable to 
inference networks of arbitrary structure. The 
approximation of the distribution by a sample 
allows to capture the basic stochastic relations 
while being numerically feasible for larger net­
works. The resulting posterior distribution re­
flects the uncertainty in pwbability estimates 
and can directly be used for decision purposes. 
The stochastic simulation algorithm is part of 
the simulated annealing algorithm which nor-
mally is employed to solve large constraint sat­
isfaction problems. It. is inherently parallel and 
can be implemented on parallel hardware. 
In the light of the psychological studies cited 
above the uncertainty of the input proba bilities 
of ±0.1 to ±0.2 seems to be plausible for realistic 
· applications. The numerical experiments show 
that the variability of the results is of the same 
magnitude. This aspect is usually neglected by 
other methods for Bayesian networks which pro­
duce point estimates that may lead a user to 
risky decisions as he does not know the variabil­
ity of the estimates. In addition to being in gen­
eral not justified by the quality of input data, 
[Cooper 1990) has shown that computing the ex­
act solution of Bayesian networks is NP-hard, 
and therefore proposes the utilization of approx­
imate algorithms for Bayesian networks of gen­
eral type. The above algorithm is approximate 
and derives the variability of the results. By in­
creasing the sample size n, the accuracy may be 
adapted such that it meets the variability of the 
results. is sufficient for the desired purpose. and 
remains computationally feasible. 
An important issue, �vhich remains to be studied 
in more detail, concerns the properties of the dif­
ferent ·noninformative' prior distributions. This 
amounts to specifying the state of complete ig­
norance about the unknown probability distribu­
tion. The prior used in this paper has the advan­
tage of uniform marginal and conditional densi­
ties, while other priors are insensitive to trans­
formations (Dirichlet priors) or concentrate on 
maximum entropy configurations [Berger 1980 
p. 75) . Especially the latter approach seems to 
be promising for future investigations. 
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